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When asked about the Code of Conduct and how it had applied to him while he was in captivity, the first prisoner of war from the Gulf War, Jeffrey Zaun, told author and West Point Military Academy professor Major Elliott Gruner, "We gave that [the Code] up years ago."

Navy pilot Zaun, who was shot down and captured by Iraqi forces January 18, 1991, became an instant hero after his bruised and battered face was televised by CNN two days later. His injuries and zombie like behavior confirmed what Americans have grown to expect U.S. military men to endure if captured. "Our leaders and our people have wrongly attacked the peaceful people of Iraq," the battered Zaun told an interrogator during the Iraqi produced television special, which was transmitted all over the world by CNN.

"They are trying to show that knights on white horses are reduced to whimpering wimps," Vice Adm. James Stockdale, a retired Navy flier who spent more than seven years as a POW enduring Vietnamese torture, said after viewing the videotape of Zaun.

"This is supposed to convince Iraqis to 'go get your guns and we can take these people to the cleaners." "His predicament reminded us of the plight of Vietnam POWs who had become heroes," Gruner, author of Prisoners of Culture: Representing the American POW, wrote about Zaun's captivity.

"At the time of the broadcast we could only imagine what he must have endured before finally making such an appearance." The POW experience, Gruner wrote, "is a persistent and pervasive image in American culture."

Gruner questioned whether our "young soldiers" get more information about being a POW from the movies and television than from mandated military training sessions. He cited two popular films, The Great Escape and Rambo First Blood Part II, as examples of how film and television "seem to have become the controlling image of POW lore."

In reality, very few POWs have ever escaped and, as Gruner pointed out, the "Great Escape" of seventy-six allied POWs during World War II actually resulted in tragedy. "Seventy-three POWs were recaptured. Fifty of these were executed," he wrote.

"The escape did little or nothing to harm the German war effort. The escape thus set only three prisoners free at the cost of fifty lives and harsher conditions for thousands of remaining POWs. The escape was not so 'great' after all."

The sensational image of successful POW resistance portrayed by the "mythic POW-hero," Rambo, when he survived hideous torture by the Vietnamese communists long enough to amazingly escape, is blown apart by the "flesh-and-blood" fact that very few U.S. prisoners have ever successfully resisted torture or escaped.

Vietnamese communists, especially the Viet Cong (South Vietnamese communists), were particularly unmerciful in their treatment of U.S. prisoners of war. Their POW policy was brutally simple. The communists ignored all international laws that pertained to holding POWs--using execution, torture, deprivation and humiliation against any U.S. prisoners that resisted. A prisoner would either collaborate or die, quickly making giving "only" name, rank, serial number and date of birth an outdated code impossible to follow if the prisoner wanted to live.

After his release, Zaun candidly admitted that he nor any of the other POWs had been tortured. He did not know, however, at the time he made that claim, that both female U.S. soldiers captured by the Iraqis had been sexually violated and that the Pentagon had kept the assaults secret for more than a year.

The Iraqis did not have to torture the Gulf War POWs because the prisoners had learned from the Vietnam POW experience and played along with their captors, allowing their image to be broadcast so their status as a live prisoner would be confirmed.

They believed their statements damning the United States effort would later be discredited. Zaun said that "90 percent of [his] facial injuries were caused by ejection." He said he had hit himself in the nose and face as hard as he could stand when he learned the Iraqis were taking him to a television station. His self-inflicted disfigurement apparently prevented a second television broadcast.

The Code of Conduct has only been changed one time since President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed it into law by executive order on August 17, 1955. In response to the Vietnam POW experience, President Jimmy Carter modified the code by executive order in 1977 to make it "more reasonable."

In the original writing, the Code of Conduct was declared the definitive code specifying the responsibilities of American military personnel while in combat or captivity. The Code, consisting of six articles in simple language, orders American military personnel to resist capture at all cost and if captured; to attempt to escape, to give the enemy no information other than name, rank, serial number and date of birth, to take charge if senior, to obey orders of the seniors, to accept no favors from the enemy and to make no written or oral statements disloyal to the United States.

In short, the Code holds POWs responsible to protect--at whatever cost--the cause for which the United States stands by continuing to carry on some form of resistance with the enemy. The establishment of the Code of Conduct was the result of what was considered in 1955 an embarrassing high number of U.S. servicemen held prisoner during the Korean War who apparently did little to resist collaborating with the enemy.

According to a Congressional Research Service Report (CRS), one out of every three American prisoners of the North Koreans and Chinese collaborated. The degree of collaboration ranged from such serious offenses as actually siding with the enemy to the relatively insignificant offense of broadcasting Christmas greetings home and therefore putting the communists in favorable light. Although collaborating with the enemy is nothing new, there were a number of examples of it during WWII. Its ramifications, however, caused considerable damage to the morale and survival of U.S. POWs during the Korean War and later the Vietnam War.

The Korean War marked a new dimension in the relationship between U.S. servicemen taken prisoner and their captors. For the first time, U.S. prisoners of war were viewed by an enemy as more than soldiers from the other side temporarily restrained from conducting war. It was the first war fought by the United States against an enemy whose pathological desire to control the minds of U.S. prisoners extended the war into the POW camps. North Korean and Chinese communists were not hesitant to use brutal and bloody torture as gruesome tools in their efforts to exploit U.S. prisoners of war into making public statements that appeared favorable to the communist war effort.

Communist interrogators also sought to further control their prisoners by manipulating them into looking to the detaining authorities as a source of leadership, thereby breaking down the leadership and internal discipline within the POW population.

In previous wars, prisoners were subjected to some inhumane and brutal treatment, but the enemy did not take it upon itself to tear down the chain of command within the prisoner ranks.

When the communists succeeded, a condition of distrust among the prisoners became the norm rather than the exception. Morale dropped and mutual assistance among the prisoners lessened.

Very few American servicemen were mentally prepared to protect themselves from such barbaric treatment and intense doctrination attempts.

Through inhumane treatment and manipulation, many prisoners were forced to collaborate with the communists. Twenty-one chose to remain in China, refusing repatriation.

After the termination of the hostilities in Korea and the subsequent release of American prisoners of war, many former U.S. prisoners were criminally charged and tried for offenses that "amounted to treason, desertion to the enemy, mistreatment of fellow prisoners of war, and similar crimes."

The emotions and compassion of the public were aroused, as graphic details of the inhumane treatment of U.S. POWs in communist prison camps surfaced during the trials. Public discussion caused intense arguments over what should have been done about Americans who were "brainwashed" in Korea and what to do about those in future wars who may be the recipients of similar bloody treatment.

Some argued the Army had been too harsh, while others insisted the Air Force was too lenient in their handling of repatriated servicemen.

In its overall approach to the problem, the Air Force chose not to court martial any former POWs, although it did force a number of them to resign because of misconduct in the prison camps.

The Army, however, convicted several men who subsequently received heavy sentences. They had been charged with homicide, "treasonable collaboration" with the enemy and informing on fellow prisoners. The differing approaches led veterans organizations to demand the U.S. government to prescribe one uniform code of conduct for all military service personnel.

On August 7, 1954, the Secretary of Defense directed that a committee be formed to recommend a suitable approach for conducting a comprehensive study of the problems related to the entire Korean War POW experience. The work of that committee resulted in the May 17, 1955 appointment of the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, headed by Carter L. Burgess, assistant secretary of defense for Manpower and Personnel.

The committee took heed of the ongoing divisive debate, noting that while all services had regulations governing the conduct of prisoners of war, "the United States armed forces have never had a clearly defined code of conduct applicable to American prisoners after capture." Claiming the new code had been hammered out of "home-forged" American principles with no room for turncoats--prisoners who declare their allegiance to the enemy--the committee conceded that the Code did, however, allow special consideration for those who yield only under torture.

The committee agreed that a line of resistance must be drawn somewhere and as far forward as possible. The give only name, rank and serial number provision of the Geneva Prisoner of War Conventions of 1929 and 1949 was accepted as the line of resistance. "However, in the face of experience, it is recognized that the POW may be subjected to an extreme of coercion beyond his ability to resist. If in his battle with the interrogator he is driven from his first line of resistance, he must be trained for resistance in successive positions. And, to stand on the final line to the end-no disclosure of vital military information and above all no disloyalty in word or deed to his country, his service or his comrades," the committee said.

The committee further acknowledged that the Armed Forces had not adequately prepared their men for "communist brainwashing" attempts. It said the Defense Department should devise a special program for teaching means of resisting and surviving enemy interrogation.

Some POWs, the committee found, were at a disadvantage in interrogation sessions because they knew less about the ideals of democracy and traditions of their own country than their communist interrogators. Interestingly, less than 20 years later, the U.S. Armed Forces again found themselves facing an almost identical, embarrassing and emotional situation as they did after the Korean War.

The new dimension of U.S. women in combat has now added the high possibility of rape to the hazards of military service and the POW experience.

Immediately following communist Vietnam's release of American prisoners of war, a number of senior ranking former POWs sought to court martial eight enlisted former POWs, accusing them of mutiny, treason and openly selling out their fellow prisoners in return for soft treatment from their prison guards, collaborating with their captors to the point of wearing North Vietnamese uniforms and seeking permission to join the North Vietnamese Army.

Again an emotional and public debate was sparked as to what action, if any, should be taken against the former prisoners. One side of the debate, which included some former prisoners of war, advocated a "forgive and forget" policy.

The other side, also including some former prisoners of war, demanded the military penalize those who had "undermined discipline" by their collaboration. The debate, however, was quickly muted when one of the enlisted men charged with collaborating committed suicide.

Within days of the suicide, the secretaries of the Army and Navy decided to drop all charges against the enlisted men, declaring there was not enough evidence against the accused prisoners to warrant court martial proceedings.

Military sources defended the Pentagon's decision to drop the charges claiming a "lack of legally sufficient evidence and because of the policy of the Department of Defense against holding trials for alleged propaganda statements."

In dismissing the charges, Army Secretary Howard H. Callaway said, "We must not overlook the good behavior of these men during the two to three years each spent under brutal prison conditions in South Vietnam, before they were moved to the North--the lack of food and medical care, the sub-primitive living conditions and the physical torture. "They had a very hard time and they behaved admirable during this period."

Three months later, Navy Secretary John W. Warner dropped misconduct charges against two other ex-prisoners, both officers who had been accused of "mutiny, aiding the enemy and failing to obey an order."

Again a Presidential commission was appointed. It reevaluated the code of 1955 in 1976, recommending a subtle revision to Article V which, in its original form, stated: When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to only give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

The word "bound" was changed to "required" and the word "only" was deleted. After President Carter ordered the change in 1977, a Navy spokesman explained. "The feeling was to make it more reasonable. You can only take so much . . . They don't expect you to be a superman, or superwoman, or superhuman."

But in 1979, after Marine private Bobby Garwood managed to slip a note out of Hanoi stating that he was still being held prisoner of the communists and that he knew of 15 other U.S. prisoners, the Pentagon quickly disregarded its concern for how much a POW is supposed to be able to take and temporarily reverted back to the old code.

After the Vietnamese finally released Garwood, the Marine Corps tried him for treason, desertion, and collaboration. Garwood, who had spent 14 years as a prisoner of the communists, was convicted of collaboration. He was forced to forfeit all back pay and given a dishonorable discharge.

It has been forty years since the Code of Conduct was first "hammered out." The U.S. military and its technology has changed significantly, thus making the battlefield more fluid and exposing more U.S. service personnel to the chance of being captured.

The majority of our military personnel are still not being realistically trained in what to expect from the enemy if captured. Some do attend specialized survival schools, but most of the resistance and survival training is offered only to pilots and special operations personnel. The new dimension of U.S. women in combat has now added the high possibility of rape to the hazards of military service and the POW experience.

It is obvious that the Code of Conduct, in its current form, is not enough to protect U.S. prisoners of war from an enemy who has become more sophisticated in its abilities to exploit prisoners. After prisoners have resisted "to the utmost" of his or her ability, then what do they do? The Code does not answer that question.