U.S. Government Ignored Reports Indicating MIAs Duke and Mark Were Alive After the War

U.S. Government Ignored Reports Indicating MIAs Duke and Mark Were Alive After the War

June/July 1996 Issue
U.S. Veteran Dispatch Staff Report

After Charles R. Duke and Kit T. Mark disappeared in Pleiku Province, Vietnam on 30 May 1970, there were few leads to follow. Rather than casualties lost on the bloody battlefields of Vietnam's Central Highlands, both men were "civilian" aircraft technicians who had been "discharged" from the military and hired as civilian employees by the Dynaelectron Corporation. Instead of being dressed in jungle fatigues and laden with hand grenades and ammunition after being inserted into a combat area by venerable "Huey" gun ships, both men were wearing civilian clothing while pleasure riding on motorcycles at the time they became missing.
After initiating only a cursory investigation and with no evidence proving Duke and Mark alive or dead, the U.S. military placed their incident folder on the bottom of the stack and dismissed it to an inactive status. The Defense Prisoner of War and Missing-in-Action Office (DPMO) confirmed the "inactive" categorization in its recent "Comprehensive Review" released to Congress.
Despite the fact that after a fifteen month investigation the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs admitted (begrudgingly) in 1992 that U.S. prisoners were left behind alive in captivity after the end of the Vietnam War, the Pentagon still contends there is no credible evidence to prove it. Many American experts say there is evidence to prove it, including Garnett "Bill" Bell, former Chief of the U.S. Office for POW/MIA Affairs in Hanoi. Bell testified before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in November 1991 that at least 10 Americans were remaining in Vietnam at the conclusion of "Operation Homecoming" in 1973.
Bell based his contention on wartime information contained in U.S. files and new information uncovered during his tenure as the senior U.S. Government field investigator in Vietnam in the 1980s. One source of information was a defecting Vietnamese government mortician, whose identity has been confirmed in Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) photographs and who subsequently proved to experts of the Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii (CILHI) "beyond a shadow of doubt" that he was a bonafide mortician with considerable experience in processing the skeletal remains of American prisoners of war.
The mortician later passed a DIA polygraph examination with no deception indicated. Bell researched six separate items of information provided by the mortician. Bell was able to confirm that the information related by the mortician to the U.S. government was true and accurate by interviewing refugees throughout Southeast Asia and accompanying aircraft technical experts from the Boeing Corporation to inspect wreckage in Vietnam.
According to the mortician, while making visits a communist office responsible for maintaining records on U.S. POWs and remains in Hanoi from 1974 until 1979, he periodically observed three American "stay-behinds."
The mortician later defected to the U.S. and in a face-to-face meeting with former Marine Private Robert Garwood, who was released in 1979 after being held by the communists for 14 years, identified Garwood as one of the three Americans he had observed.
Based on descriptions provided by the mortician, an expert of the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) completed composite sketches of all three Americans. Although the DIA gave little credence to the story, Bell began a detailed comparative analysis of the information with all the records contained in the "Bright Light" data base. Ultimately, he came to the conclusion that one of the three Americans observed by the mortician was Charles Duke and that there is a strong possibility the other is Kit Mark. Bell emphasized that a positive identification could not be made from only a composite sketch. However, the mortician reported that two of the men he observed were employed as aircraft technicians. Bell does not believe it to be merely a coincidence that an American matching the physical description of Duke was observed in the same office in Hanoi where the mortician said he observed Garwood from 1974 until 1979.
Duke's job as an aircraft technician, the physical description of the man observed in Hanoi, the apparent match between the sketch and the photograph of Duke, and the lack of any credible evidence indicating Duke is dead all combined to form compelling evidence for Bell. Although some government analysts have relied on a theory that the two men observed in the Hanoi office where Garwood was seen were "Soviet" or "Communist bloc" technicians working with the North Vietnamese, Bell finds this implausible because, in his opinion, "if our government has been truthful concerning absolutely superb, full faith cooperation from the Russians and the Vietnamese, we would have already been given the identities of the two men." In the below review, the staff of The U.S. Veteran Dispatch has included a number of reports which Bell believes merit investigation.
U.S. government officials have ignored these reports in the past, dismissing most, if not all, of these reports as being "fabrications" or "implausible." The only report correlated to Duke by the U.S. Government is from a refugee in Singapore indicating that two Americans were killed and their bodies thrown into a gully. Amazingly, it is a "hearsay" report, which our government will not investigate if the report pertains to the sighting of live Americans still being held.
Of the 196 "discrepancy cases" in Vietnam, only 26 have been resolved by the recovery of remains. Most of the other cases have been classified as "fate determined" (i.e. dead) based solely on circumstantial evidence.
The staff of the U.S. Veteran strongly believes that the U.S. government should establish a policy wherein its missing servicemen and women are assumed alive and in captivity until credible evidence is presented proving differently. The benefit of the doubt should always focus on the possibility of life, not death.
The staff finds the quality of the effort thus far in accounting for both Charles Duke and Kit Mark to be extremely poor.
Most distressing is the very casual manner in which the investigation was conducted in the field, as well as the quick acceptance of questionable testimony provided by a witness prepared in advance by the government of Vietnam.
Many of the reports listed should have been investigated long ago. The U.S. government will now probably claim that it is too late, the terrain has changed, witnesses have passed away, wild animals have dragged away all the evidence, etc.

A Comprehensive Review of Case 1625

On 1 June 1970, Charles R. Duke, Jr. and Kit T. Mark, employees of Dynaelectron Corporation, were reported missing when Mr. Duke failed to report to Pleiku, after the 30-31 May 1970 weekend holiday, for his return to the United States. Mr. Duke and Mr. Mark were last seen by Dynaelectron employee Landel Scott on Saturday, 30 May 1970. The two men indicated that they intended to ride motorbikes to an area known as Bald Mountain, about seven miles south of Pleiku.
On 1 June 1970, Warren L. McKean, Pleiku site supervisor, notified the Dynaelectron Corporation, Southeast Asia office, in Saigon, of the missing personnel. All U.S. and South Vietnamese military authorities and hospitals in the Pleiku area were checked, but neither men were found, and an unsuccessful search of the Bald Mountain area, the Lake Bien Ho area, the Pleiku area, and the roads from Pleiku was conducted by helicopter on 1 June 1970.
On 17 June 1970, an American Embassy consular officer visited Pleiku to inquire about the disappearance of the two men and was informed that the following measures had been taken to locate them: a U.S. Army unit conducted a ground sweep and a helicopter search on 1 June. Montagnard tribesmen were hired to go into the nearby villages to make discreet inquires, leaflets advertising a reward for information about the two men were dropped in the area, and the government of Vietnam sent agents into villages in the area. All of these efforts were unsuccessful.
The Two-party Joint Military Commission was given details of this case and it was discussed with the Province Representative on several occasions. In March 1975, he reiterated his intent to recover remains from an alleged grave site in this area after his staff completed extant projects. After evacuation from the Central Highlands, the Province Representative told the ADO, Military Region II, that his staff had recovered some remains, but had not given them to him prior to his evacuation. These individuals' names and identifying data were turned over to the Four-party Joint Military Team with a request for any information available. No response was forthcoming.
On 17 and 18 January 1994, an investigation "element" of the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTFFA) and a team of Vietnamese officials conducted a joint investigation of this case in Pleiku City, Chu Pah district, and Mang Yang district of Gia Lai (formerly Pleiku) province. The element received testimony from a witness who claimed that he and two other members of the B-6 guerrilla unit were shooting fish in the river with AK-47 rifles when the two Americans first appeared.
The same witness claimed to have participated in the killing of two male Caucasians riding on motorcycles in March or April of 1970. According to the witness, the bodies of both men were left lying on the ground where they were killed and the two motorcycles were set on fire. The element conducted a search at the site where the two men were reportedly killed, as well as the site where they indicated they had planned to visit shortly before they disappeared. No material evidence, remains, or personal effects were found by the joint element and the case has now been placed in "pending" (i.e. inactive) status.

Bell's Assessment of Case 1625:

The site which the two men planned to visit has been described as "Bald Mountain." Apparently this is a reference to "Dragon's Jaw Mountain" (i.e. Nui Ham Rong, aka Chu Hodrong) overlooking Camp Hensel, a former base camp of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division. The site where the witness claimed the two men were killed is located on Route 509, which served as the primary resupply route for the Plei Djereng (Project Omega/Truong Son Group) Special Forces Camp at the time of the incident. Although the element's investigation report indicates that the witness did not give the appearance of having been coached and the element assessed the reliability of the witness as "good," there are several points which do not appear to be plausible.
For example, the witness claimed that at the time of the incident, the bridge was constructed of concrete. The witness further stated that the bridge is currently constructed of iron or steel.
Actually, at the time of the incident, this was a frequently travelled route. All major bridges in the Pleiku area, especially those constructed of concrete or steel located on main supply routes were constantly guarded by either U.S. or South Vietnamese forces. The bridge pointed out by the witness in this case was most likely guarded by a local forces unit of the GVN. (Note: contrary to the testimony of the witness, the portion of the Detailed Report of the Investigation compiled by the CILHI Search and Recovery Specialist indicates that the bridge in question is now constructed of concrete). In any case, considering the location of the bridge on Route 509, its close proximity to Pleiku where the U.S. II Corps Hq was located, ARVN Ranger units, elements of the 22nd and 23rd ARVN Divisions, the U.S. 4th Infantry Division, U.S. Special Forces units, and a number of local and popular forces units of the GVN, it is highly unlikely that communist guerrilla forces would emerge on the roadway during the daylight hours to shoot fish with AK-47 rifles. Had their intention been to shoot fish, it would have been far more plausible for them to have done so in an area away from the main road. This route was also routinely patrolled by helicopters from aviation units located at nearby Camps Holloway and Hensel. Simply put, it just does not make sense for three communist guerrillas to risk being shot or captured by shooting fish from a bridge on a main road when there were numerous rivers and streams with good concealment throughout the area.
The three guerrillas participating in the attack might well have been living as "legals" (i.e. legal residents with GVN identification cards working secretly for communist forces), and would, therefore, be expected to draw little attention. However, in this case, according to the witness, the three men were armed with communist issue AK-47 rifles, which would have alerted anyone passing by as to their guerrilla status. During the war, ARVN or any other non-communist Vietnamese did not carry AK-47s because they were fearful of being mistaken for a Viet Cong and killed on the spot. On the other hand, if the trio was on an armed mission to kill American personnel, a detailed report of the action would have been submitted.
This is not plausible, because the Vietnamese have indicated that no records were initiated as a result of the incident.
According to the witness, he would have been 17 years old at the time of the incident. The witness claimed that although he is an ethnic minority hill tribesman, who served as a member of the B-6 village guerrilla unit at the time of the incident, he moved to reside in the City of Pleiku only approximately seven months after he allegedly killed the two men. The JTF-FA element made no attempt to have the witness explain this unusual move, nor is there any information contained in the report which can shed any light on the witnesses' activities prior to or after the alleged killings occurred.
Specifically, there was no attempt to ascertain whether or not the witnesses were ever in contact with the two Americans prior to their alleged deaths, or whether or not the alleged killings were prearranged. Considering the age of the witness at the time, and the fact that he moved into the city shortly after the incident, it would seem logical that this was the only case in which this witness was involved in an action where American personnel were killed.
Since killing someone can be expected to be an unusual event, the witness can reasonably be expected to recall far greater detail than that revealed to the JTF-FA element during the field investigation.
For example, the witness should have been able to clearly recall the time frame, the weather conditions (i.e. beginning of the rainy season), what documents were removed from the bodies, what type of report was submitted to higher authorities informing them of the action, the disposition of any personal effects, and the identities of the other two guerrillas involved.
Moreover, considering the fact that the incident occurred on a major transportation route in close proximity to numerous allied military units, it is highly unlikely that the trio would have ignited both motorcycles due to the smoke and fire, nor would they leave the two bodies lying in plain view to be observed by passing traffic.
Again, this is an important point, because if the witness was being truthful about leaving the burning motorcycles on the ground, the allied ground and air searches of the area after the two Americans were reported missing would have observed "two large burning motorcycles and two bodies on the ground." Since the witness was described by the JTF-FA element as being "attentive to the questions and definite about the extent of his knowledge," the element should have insisted that he provide clarifying details as to the precise nature of the wounds inflicted on the two men, a more precise physical description, and explain the manner in which the two motorcycles were ignited (e.g. covered with brush or leaves, fuel from tanks drained to sustain fire).
Additionally, the witness should have provided at least some information concerning his activities leading up to the incident, his route taken to the incident site, and his route of withdrawal. The witness should have been requested to provide information concerning the disposition and composition of the B-6 guerrilla unit for comparison of his information with other wartime sources. The JTF-FA element did not mention which regional dialect of Vietnamese was spoken by the witness, any assessment of his background based on vocabulary and terminology used during the interview session, demeanor, knowledge of general wartime incidents and actions in the same area, his ability to converse in a Montagnard language, his particular tribal affiliation (e.g. Jiarai, Rhade, Bahnar) or other pertinent details reasonably expected to be covered during the investigation of a "last known alive" type case.
In the absence of significant details such as those outlined above and the fact that the witness was interviewed on only one occasion by the experts of the JTF-FA, it is difficult to conceive how the JTF-FA element was able to even properly evaluate the reliability of the witness at all, much less to classify it as "good."
Other reports which should have been investigated in conjunction with this case include, but are not limited to, the following:
-- The report from the 525th Military Intelligence Group indicating that on 9 October 1970, two sources visited Plei Vieng Duong (YA 590965). The two Sources heard from the village chief that two American POWs were taken through the village by four North Vietnamese Army personnel during late June 1970. The two Americans were described as Caucasians wearing black pajamas and their heads had been shaved. The two Americans were held in the village for approximately six hours before departing on an infiltration route. (The sources of this report were described by the 525th MI Gp as having reported reliably for more than two years).
-- The CIA report indicating that in December 1970, two Americans captured in South Vietnam were detained in a camp located at Ban Tam Prin, about 43 km north of Dak Chung in Laos. One of the Americans was said to be short with black hair and the second man taller with white hair. The Ban Tam Prin area was said to contain a "Supreme Command Training Center." (Note: it would have been plausible for U.S. POWs to have been moved from Cambodia into Laos during this time frame. The two men involved in this case were captured only two weeks after a joint U.S./Truong Son Group (Doan Truong Son) cross-border raid was conducted by helicopter from Pleiku into Cambodia in the area of the communist wartime V-211 Hospital of Sr. Col (Doctor) Le Cao Dai and POW Camp 102).
-- The report of the 525th MI Group indicating that in May 1971, two Caucasians were observed while accompanying the B-1 and B-2 VC/NVA Companies approximately 25 km northwest of Pleiku (AR 967701). The two Caucasians were believed to be acting as "advisors" to communist units. The sources of this report were said to have been reporting reliably in the past.(Note: since the witness interviewed by the experts of the JTF-FA were informed that the two Americans on motorcycles were killed by members of the B-6 guerrilla unit, sound investigative procedures require that additional information concerning the possible relationship of units B-1 and B-2 to B-6 contained in the above report be developed)
-- The report by a defecting Vietnamese mortician indicating that he personally observed three male Caucasians in Hanoi from 1974 to 1979. After the mortician arrived in the United States, one of the three men was positively identified by him as being Robert Garwood. One of three composite sketches made with the assistance of the mortician matches the pre-capture photograph of Charles R. Duke, and a second sketch closely resembles Kit Mark. The three Caucasians were observed at Office 22 of Group 875, which was located at 3 Duong Thanh Street in Hanoi. The mortician heard from cadre of Office 22 that the three Caucasians were Americans and that two of them were working as aircraft technicians at the Da Phuc Airfield north of Hanoi. In investigating the report concerning three Caucasians observed by the mortician, the JTF-FA experts should include information pertaining to possible "stay behinds" contained in U.S. files which could possibly correlate to this case.
For example, the report by a rallier (SGN FVS 32,810, 24 Jul 73) indicating that he had personally observed two Americans on three separate occasions.
According to the rallier, the two men were collaborating with the Political Staff Section of the PAVN 2nd Division in Military Region 5 in proselytizing efforts toward luring other American personnel to cooperate with communist forces; the report by a refugee in Hong Kong (JCRC H84-048) indicating that he had been assigned to a film crew to film two American caucasians north of Hanoi in 1977; the report by a refugee in Los Angeles indicating that he observed Americans remaining in the Hanoi area as late as 1984, and that these men worked repairing aircraft left behind by U.S. forces after the war ended. According to this source, the Americans often surfaced at a hotel in Hanoi which had been converted into a military office, and that the same hotel was connected to the Ministry of National Defence compound by a secret tunnel built by the French; the report by a refugee in Hong Kong (JCRC Report Z30416) indicating that he observed Americans remaining in Hanoi during 1982. According to the refugee, the Americans were observed in an area adjacent to the Central Military Court and Office 22, which was located next to the Phung Hung Hotel where communist intelligence operatives returning from South Vietnam were debriefed during the war.
The Phung Hung Hotel is located at the eastern entrance to an underground tunnel to the Ministry of National Defense compound; the report by a refugee and former Major of the Military Security Service which was provided during the 1995 annual meeting of the National Alliance of Families. The refugee provided one sighting pertaining to Robert Garwood and another sighting pertaining to three Americans he observed in Camp 1, Duong Quy village, Van Ban district, Hoang Lien Son province during August 1977; the numerous reports indicating that a "blind American" remained behind in the Central Highlands area after the war ended (Note: these reports are centered on the former B-3 Front area where the two men in this case were last observed, however, these reports possibly correlate to Case 0811-0-03, Allard, Richard M.); the report by an American deserter who returned to the U.S. in late 1975 indicating that 20 U.S. POWs were still being held in the Central Highlands as of 1975. According to the deserter, the 20 U.S. POWs included one black enlisted man captured during 1970; the report by a refugee (JCRC T84-110) who was a LTC and former VNAF pilot indicating that he personally observed 20 "foreign" POWs, including 14 Americans held in the western Central Highlands during 1972, after all known U.S. POWs had already been moved north to Hanoi.
According to the refugee, the group included a black Master Sergeant called "Bob." (Note: this same source provided two other separate reports which were correlated to Cases 0155 and 2001); the Thai Humint report (290845Z Aug 84) indicating that 23 U.S. POWs were being held at Ban Kadon in Saravan province Laos as of August 1984; the report provided by the former Soviet Consul General in Danang indicating that three Americans remained in the western Central Highlands area as late as 1982 (Note: this report might possibly correlate to Case 1171 involving 12 U.S. Army personnel lost in a ground incident on 12 May 1968); the reports indicating that Fifth Column Penetration Section of the Military Proselytizing Office of Central Highlands/Military Region 5 used American POWs to teach English to communist female agents for the purpose of luring American servicemen to capture.
The JTF-FA experts should interview former Regional Current Affairs Committee member Ho Nghinh, aka Ho Huu Phuoc (Note: Ho Huu Phuoc vice Ngo Hau Phuoc as mentioned in the report associated with the so-called "three amigos"/Robertson, Lundy, Stevens photo) concerning the methods employed to lure American personnel in the Central Highlands area, with emphasis on Cases 0108, 0155, 0286, 0439, 0604, 0740, 0951, 1038, 1217, 1219, 1231, 1249, 1476, 1625, 1767, 2055, 2056, and 9951; the JTF-FA experts should also interview Mr. Bui Van Thanh, a native of Tam Ky who was assigned to the MR-5 Military Proselytizing Office and is now retired and residing in Chu Prong district of Dac Lac province; the JTF-FA experts should also research the historical archives of the B-3 Front and "Southernmost Extremity" (i.e. Cuc Nam) located in Nha Trang City (Note: the experts should also contact former Interrogator of U.S. POWs and English Language translator for POW camps of the B-3 Front, Mr Khuong Xuan Que, who is now residing in Nha Trang), the archives of the Central Party Military Affairs Committee in Hanoi, the archives of the Military Affairs Committee of Region 5, and the permanent archives of the Party Central Committee in Hanoi.
General background: this case is located within the boundary of the B-3 front, aka the Western Highlands Front (Mat tran Tay nguyen). The B-3 Front was initially an integral part of Inter-region 5 (i.e. Inter-region meaning the region linking North Vietnam with the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in the South), which was established in June 1961. This Hq, which was later redesignated Military Region 5, was located in the Hiep Duc area southwest of Danang. The Hq initially controlled the Military Affairs Committees (Quan uy) of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Dac Lac, Pleiku, and Kon Tum. In May 1964, the provinces of Khanh Hoa and Phu Yen were redesignated as the "Southern Extremity" (Cuc nam) of MR-5. The provinces of Dac Lac, Pleiku, and Kon Tum were redesignated as the Western Region of MR-5.
In September 1965, the Western Region was redesignated as the Western Highlands Front, aka B-3. In 1965, the province of Dac Lac was divided with that portion of the province north of Highway 26 subordinate to the B-3 front, and that portion of the province south of Highway 26 subordinate to Military
Region 6.
The provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien were redesignated as Military Region Tri-Thien and placed under the direct control of the PAVN High Command in Hanoi. Mr-5 was commanded by MG Nguyen Don (ddoon), who was later replaced by Gen Chu Huy Man when he was transferred from his "two hat" position of Commander and Political Commissar of the B-3 front, which he held since July 1965.
Two well known Political Commissars were Gen Doan Khue, who was later reassigned to command the Binh Dinh Front (note: currently SRV Defense Minister), and LTG Nguyen Nam Khanh, who was previously the Political Commissar of the 3rd PAVN Div, aka Yellow Star Division (Su doan Sao vang) (note: LTG Khanh is currently the Deputy Director of the General Political Directorate, PAVN). The B-3 front bordered on Pathet Lao wartime Military Regions 3 and 4 in the LPDR. MR-3 and MR-4 in Laos were under the military control of the 968th Pavn Div.
-- Major units operating in the B-3 Front area during the war include the 1st PAVN Div, aka Work Site 1, (established in December 1965 by the B-3 Party Chapter (Dang bo) and later incorporated the 6th PAVN Div which was disbanded shortly after formation in December 1965, initially comprised of the 33rd, 66th, and 320th Inf Regt's). The 1st Div was disbanded in late 1969 and subordinate Regt's were moved to the Mekhong Delta, the Enemy Proselyting Section, aka Group 21, of the 1st Div captured several U.S. POWs prior to moving south to the Delta. Some of these men are currently carried on the last known alive list for Gia Lai-Kon Tum). The 5th PAVN Div (Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, and Dac Lac), the 10th PAVN Div (formerly 325B Div) (Gia Lai-Kon Tum), the 320th Independent Regt, aka Work Site 320 (Cong truong 320) (Gia Lai-Kon Tum), the 9th Regt, 304th Div deployed to southern Laos in 1965 and was redeployed to Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue in late 1966 and participated in the battle for Hue during "Tet" 1968 (most members were from Thai Binh province North Vietnam and probably returned there after the war ended), the 24th Regt, Left Bank (Ta ngan) Military Region (northern Dac Lac, Gia Lai-Kon Tum, most members were from Nam Ha in North Vietnam and probably returned there after the war), the 28th Regt (moved from North Vietnam to the B-3 Front in early 1969 and incorporated the 8th, 8B, and 3rd Independent Bn's of MR Tri-Thien-Hue, moved to Highway 9 in Quang Tri in 1968, in early 1970 moved to southern Laos with the 24A regt, and finally returned to Kon Tum to participate in the Vo Dinh battle of 1972), the 33rd Regt (formerly the 101B Regt, operated in Dac Lac area as of 1967), the 66th Regt, 304th PAVN Div (note: LTG Tran Van Quang, the purported author of the "1205" document found in the archives of the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union, was the first Political Commissar of the 304th Div during the war against the French) (Gia Lai and Kon Tum until decimated by the U.S. 1st Cav and 3rd Brigade, 25th Inf Div during 1665-66.
The 66th withdrew to Thanh Hoa and later redeployed to the Quang Tri area and southern Laos, and finally moved back to Kon Tum to participate in the battle for Dak To during the 1972 spring offensive; most members were from Hung Yen province in North Vietnam and probably returned there when the war ended), the 304B PAVN Div, established in September 1965 (Gia Lai and Kon Tum), the 88th Regt, 308th PAVN Div (Gia Lai-Kon Tum), the 95th Regt (Sa Thay district mid-1966, Gia Lai 1967-68, Mang Yang Pass/Highway 19 area 1968-69), the 101A Regt, 325A PAVN Div (Gia Lai-Kon Tum), the 33rd Regt, aka 101B Regt, 325B PAVN Div (northern Dac Lac and Gia Lai-Kon Tum), the 209th Regt (moved from North Vietnam to the B-3 Front in late 1968), the 250th Transport Regt, B-3 Front (Dac Lac, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa), the 559th Military Logistics Group (from the Western Highlands area to Vinh in MR-4), and numerous local force units of the various provinces. Also, the 1st and 40th Regt's of the 2nd PAVN Div were moved from the Quang Nam-Danang area to participate in the 1972 battle for Dak To.
-- When PAVN troops began arriving in the B-3 Front during mid-1965, B-3 forces consisted of three infantry regiments, one sapper battalion and a number of artillery battalions. Each province military command consisted of one infantry battalion, one sapper company and a number of artillery detachments. Each district military command (designated as "H" plus a number) consisted of one infantry unit from platoon to company size. The primary units in contact with U.S. Forces in the B-3 front beginning in 1965 were the 66th PAVN Regt (7th, 8th, and 9th bns), the 24th PAVN Regt (note: formerly the 42nd Regt) (3rd, 4th, and 5th bns), the 33rd Regiment (established in august 1965 when it absorbed the former 101st Regt of the 325B PAVN Div), the 9th Regt, and the 68th Artillery Regiment.

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