Visit the PX

July 1996

EDITOR'S NOTE: In April of 1993, the New York Times reported the discovery in Moscow of a 1972 Russian document which pertained to U.S. prisoners of war held by Hanoi during the Vietnam War. It was believed to have been authored by North Vietnamese LTG Tran Van Quang.

Quang denied any involvement with the document and key U.S. government officials involved in the POW/MIA accounting process supported his denials.

The "1205 Document" appears to be a transcript of a prepared text rather than a written report. The manner in which the document was received by the reporting Soviet official has not been determined. However, the possibility of access by Soviet and other foreign collectors to senior Vietnamese officers was very real (i.e. Soviet and Chinese technicians were present in Military Region 4 (MR-4) during the war, Chinese advisors were deployed as far south as Military Region 5 (MR-5), Cuban medical personnel were present in Quang Binh, just north of the Demilitarized Zone throughout the war and remained there during a visit to the region by Fidel Castro who entered Quang Tri Province, accompanied by former Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, and Cuban based CP-72 member and Spanish speaker, currently the director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Americas Department and Head of the Vietnamese POW/MIA Program, Mr. Nugyen Xuan Phong, during June 1973.

Such remarks, regardless of whether or not they were given from a prepared text, would have been approved in advance by higher authorities (E.G. General Political Directorate (GPD) or Party Central Committee Military Commission). Therefore, even if the SRV claims it does not have possession of this particular document, some similar document certainly would have existed at the central level when this speech was made. Similar documents are normally classified "TOP SECRET" (TOI MAT) and marked for distribution within Communist Party channels only (LUU HANH NOI BO). The phrase "in accordance with instructions of the politburo" and "even among us there is a group of comrades whose opinion who differ from the opinions of the politburo" clearly indicate that the remarks are being made to a body other than the politburo, and neither the speaker, as well as the body spoken to, include any members of the politburo.

The comment that "there are various thoughts concerning U.S. POWs, some are correct and some are not," indicate that the person presenting the remarks held a position regarding U.S. POW's at that time, and his position was considered the correct one by himself and those approving his prepared remarks. (E.G. the U.S. must declare a cease-fire and remove President Thieu before repatriation can begin; during the time the U.S. is resolving these issues we can release some more progressive prisoners, if Nixon does not hinder their return or take disciplinary measures against them; Nixon can compensate North Vietnam for war damages). Obviously, there was an opposing view to that of the speaker, and apparently that view was more conciliatory to the negotiating position of the U.S..

Comments concerning the South Vietnamese (ARVN) generals are generally correct, and the noted exceptions can be attributed to the lack of factual information available to communist cadre in remote areas and the resultant "scuttlebutt." This is the quality of information reasonably expected to have been provided by sources available to the leadership in forward commands, including, line crossers, captured U.S. and ARVN POWs, and informants working in the area of the DMZ. The assignment locations associated with the personalities mentioned in the document orient the speaker to central Vietnam, probably MR-4.

The reference to a "Ba Be" plan probably refers to the wartime communist plan to infiltrate agents into the south via Seaborne Infiltration Unit C-51 and other organs for the purposes of assassination, intimidation, and extortion of GUN/ARVN civilian and military officials. This plan came to the attention of the U.S. during 1970 or 1971, and the Phoenix Program/Provincial Reconnaissance Units were successfully deployed to counter it.

Comments concerning the 56th Regiment are probably in reference to the 56th Regiment, 3rd ARVN Division. The 3rd Regt, commanded by LTC Phan Dinh Vinh, mutinied and surrendered to the NVA at Cam Lo in Quang Tri Province on 2 April 1972. The representative from the Central Military Commission in Hanoi was Gen. Van Tien Dung, who later commanded the 1975 general offensive and also became the commander of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). With the exception of two American military personnel captured a Dong Toan Base by the 66th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment, other U.S. personnel assigned as advisors were able to evade capture and return to U.S. control.

Comments made by the speaker, indicating his concern about taking a path of concession toward the Americans, probably indicates that the politburo held a consensus that the U.S. POWs should be released, but the speaker and his superiors did not necessarily agree with that consensus. The comment that "our view" remains the same and we must resolve the issue based on political and military stabilization probably means that the body represented by the speaker did not agree with the politburo, and held that the three conditions mentioned above must be carried out before the U.S. POWs could be released. (E.G. cease-fire, remove Thieu, and war reparations paid to North Vietnam).

By the date of this document the negotiating position of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) (Note: formerly the National Liberation Front/Viet Cong and represented externally by organ "CP-72") had already dropped the removal of President Thieu as a precondition, and therefore, the author was most likely in possession of negotiating points of the "Reunification Committee," which included members of both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the PRG, and was superior to CP-72.

Comments concerning the National Defense Council indicate that the speaker was addressing a group of high ranking cadre in sensitive positions, because the existence of the Council, also called the "Inter-Ministry" was not widely known. His relationship with the council would be necessary, however, for him to have access to information concerning the "Ba Be" plan, which involved both the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior under the National Defense Council. Both the "Ba Be" plan and U.S. POWs were considered as purely intelligence matters, and as such would have come under the responsibility of the National Defense Council, rather than the Central Military Commission in Hanoi.

Concerning the figure for U.S. POWs actually held "1205", if one subtracts the figure 972 (591 Operation Homecoming, 24 Died-In-Captivity (DIC) in North Vietnam, 47 South Vietnam DIC, eight exchanged, 300 GVN-Thai-Taiwanese-Lao Commandos, Seals, and Pilots), this leaves 233, which closely approximates the last know alive list for Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail area of Laos, which was under the authority of MR-4.

Actually this list can be increased by the number of POWs (63) captured subsequent to the document, which closely approximates the last know alive list for all of Indochina (305). Some analysts have held the opinion that the reference in the document to "American POWs" pertains only to U.S. personnel, and the speaker would not likely confuse Vietnamese or third country POWs in this category. I initially agreed with this opinion, but after recalling that I processed the documentation for salaries and per diem for Vietnamese and third country nationals participating in special operations during the war, who were released or escaped from captivity in North Vietnam during early 1973, my opinion changed. All of the personnel receiving pay for their periods of confinement were determined to be employees of the U.S. government by the Federal Claims Commission in Honolulu, Hawaii, which approved the claims.

This being the case, and considering that the author of the document was referring to the prisoner population as a whole, rather than an isolated incident (E.G. BARON-52), I can understand why the author would have referred to special operations personnel as "American POWs", regardless of their ethnic origin. The reference to U.S. POWs by name probably refers to James Cutter (Jim Katlo), Norman Carl Gaddis (Norman Klarvisto), James Hiteshew (Jim Intist Shasht), and Clements (Carment). This would mean that the Vietnamese considered James Cutter and two other pilots (not named in the document) as having had some type of high altitude training, and the other three pilots (Gaddis, Hiteshew, and Clements) as having a high number of combat hours in comparison to the general pilot population.

The number of prisons mentioned in the document (11) approximates the know number of prisons prior to 1972, but the number was believed to have been reduced at the time of the document. However, if the Vietnamese did plan to withhold U.S. POWs after implementation of the Paris Agreements, some of these 11 prisons well may have been operational as of 1972.

Concerning the possibility of LTG Quang having written the document or presented the verbal remarks, he has been reported as the military commander of MR-4 and concurrently the MR-4 Region Party Secretary. It is likely that LTG Quang wore two hats throughout his assignments in central Vietnam, and therefore, could have also been MR-4 Region Party Secretary during the time he served as Commander of Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue. MR-Tri Thien-Hue, AKA B-4 Front, was under the direct control of the Central Military Commission in Hanoi, rather than the purportedly Viet Cong Lead Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) based in Damrei Phong, Hamlet, Chhlong District, Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia.

It is likely that Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue, headquartered in the A-Ngo area, west of A-Luoi, was absorbed by MR-4 to counter allied operation "LAM SON 719" during 1971. At that time, groups 559 and 968 were combined to form the 702nd Command (Bo Tu Lenh 702), and other units in the area (304th Div, 308th Div, 320th Div, 2nd Div, 324th Div, the 58th, 64th, and 368th Arty Regiments, the 230th and 237th AAA Regiments, the 7th, 83rd, and 219th Engineer Regiments, and the 198th, 297th, 397th Tank Regiments) were combined to form military group 70 (Binh Doan 70).

Other reporting indicates that LTG Quang was the Chief of the Enemy Proselyting Department during the war against the French, and as such was closely involved in POW/MIA affairs, including the employment of French stay-behinds who elected to remain in Vietnam and work for organizations subordinate to the General Political Directorate and National Defense Council.

Prior to becoming head of the Enemy Proselyting Department, LTG Quang received political training and Chinese language training in Kunming, Yunnan Province, China where wartime reporting indicates U.S. POW's were transferred from Vietnam. According to official Vietnamese spokesmen, LTG Quang was moved from Hanoi for medical treatment in East Germany just prior to "Operation Homecoming", and he remained there until operation Homecoming concluded and U.S./SRV economic talks began in Paris. Since at that time the North Vietnamese continued to insist on war reparations, and the U.S. side declined to participate for that reason, LTG Quang was recalled to Hanoi.

The Vietnamese were probably confused by the fact that Dr. Kissinger provided a letter promising five billion dollars (3.25 billion for all of Indochina and 1.75 billion specially for North Vietnam) to the Vietnamese leadership on 10 February 1973, but the U.S. side appeared to be reluctant in discussing the issue of war reparations in Paris after Operation Homecoming concluded. The type and extent of Quang's wounds or illness has not been explored, but U.S. POWs held in his area of operation (MR-4) late in the war were known to have received medical treatment (E.G. LT Ron Dodge, LT Clemie McKinney, 1LT Larry Potts, CPT Melvin Finch, and others).

General opinion: this is an authentic document from the Soviet archives. The document provides the text of remarks presented to senior officials, probably including General Van Tien Dung, the representative of the Central Military Commission and later commander of all communist forces, political commissars and other members of a regional level party chapter (Dang Bo), in central Vietnam (probably MR-4), subsequent to operation "LAM SON 719" in the spring of 1971.

LTG Quang was probably the MR-4 Regional Party Secretary, and a member (possibly the Director of National Intelligence) of the National Defense Council at the time. The document indicates that the politburo was aware of the actual number of U.S. POWs being detained, as reported through political and intelligence channels of the various Party Regions. The politburo held a consensus that the American POWs should be released, but the military leadership disagreed with this view.

Although the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) had publicly changed it's negotiating position regarding the removal of President Thieu as a precondition for a political settlement, the military leadership also did not agree with that point as of September 1972. As were most statistics reported by communist units during the war, the figures quoted in the document are most likely embellished by those concerned with receiving promotions and decorations (I.E. body count syndrome), or for propaganda/troop morale purposes. Even allowing for some embellishment, however, the figures are not inconsistent with the number of POWs that could conceivably have been held, if the Vietnamese planned to subvert the Paris agreements. Vietnamese communist methodology allows for the use of deception as part of a ruse, and there is no personal loss of face under such circumstances.

Therefore, as a matter of strategy, the Vietnamese can be expected to deny any knowledge of this document. At the same time, however, due to the error factor normally associated with translating names in reporting on foreign language documents, the possibility that LTG Quang is being truthful concerning his lack of involvement with the document, and the document was actually written by another PAVN General, such as Gen.Tran Quang Khanh should not be ruled out.

During the wartime years, captured U.S. and foreign personnel were evacuated through two separate camp systems. Personnel who were obviously performing normal military duties were placed in the custody of the Enemy Proselyting Department (Cuc Dich Van/Soviet GRU equivalent) and evacuated to a camp of the military region (Quan Khu). Subsequent to exploitation, such personnel were further evacuated to Hanoi, and copies of all relevant reports were forwarded by classified courier to the General Political Directorate in Hanoi.

However, personnel who were suspected to have been involved in intelligence or criminal activity were placed in the custody of the Intelligence and Security Services of the Military Proselyting Department (Cuc Binh Van/Soviet KGB equivalent) for evacuation to a camp of the Regional Party Committee (Khu Uy) operated by security section personnel, and directly controlled by the National Defense Council of the politburo in Hanoi. Copies of all relevant reports concerning the capture, detention, and exploitation of U.S. personnel would have been forwarded by the security sections of each village, district, province, and party committee region by classified courier to the Inter-Ministery/National Defense Council in Hanoi.

In addition to judicial processing for selected defendants, the Regional Party Committee also controlled the exploitation of U.S. and foreign personnel for propaganda purposes. Only the Military Proselytizing Department, after coordination with the politburo, had the authority for arranging prisoner swaps or early releases.

Access to U.S. personnel by third country interrogators for the purpose of joint exploitation of technology, or transfers of U.S. POWs to third countries, would necessarily have been coordinated by the Communist Party International (COMINTERN) Liaison Apparatus, such as International Liaison Group 101. The association of the person delivering the text of the prepared remarks with the Military Proselytizing Department is implied by his references to the National Defense Council.

This raises the possibility that the individual had access to records of both the Enemy Proselytizing and Military Proselytizing Departments, while the North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris were privy to only the records of the former. This may account for the discrepancy between the figures cited in the Russian document and the figures provided to U.S. negotiators in Paris.